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The impact of changes in company strategy on industrial relations is 
becoming an important theme in our field of study. There are those who 
call for a new approach in order to study this phenomenon (Kochan, 
1986, Y. Reshef, A.I. Murray, 1988). In this study we are looking 
primarily at changes in the strategie position of companies in regard 
to company structure, market position, products and production process 
in order to study the effect of those changes on company industrial 
relations, i.e. the nature of agreements (collective or individual 
agreements), the parties to the agreement (trade unions or works-
councils), the content of the agreement and last but not least the 
method of wage fixing. A second element in our study is to look at 
these changes in industrial relations in a broad manner, to also study 
policies regarding the composition of the labour force and controlling 
labour costs within the companies. 
Are these changes related due to increased competition and if so, what 
does this mean for the future of the institutions regulating industrial 
relations: will market forces replace those institutions as regulators 
of industrial relations as some predict for the United States or are 
the institutions too deeply embedded in West-European society for this 
to occur? These are the main questions guiding our research. 
We chose to carry out a prelimenary study in seven companies. A half 
open questionnaire was developed in order to interview the chairman of 
the workscouncil, the personnel manager and the company director in 
each company. At a later stage, only partly as a follow-up on the case-
studies, we held a representative survey among the chairmen of works-
councils in companies with 100 or more employees in the market sector. 
The aim of this questionnaire was to establish the role of the works-
council in collective bargaining and to see whether the workscouncil is 
emerging as a competitor to trade unions in this respect. In this 
contribution we will use some of the results of this survey in order to 
paint a more representative picture of changes occuring in dutch 
industrial relations, then a case-study approach allows for. 
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Bargaining arrangements 
In Table 1 some of the main characteristics of the companies in our 
case study are represented. The companies have a diverse background in 
services such as consultancy, retail or wholesale and in manufacturing. 
The degree of internationalization in ownership is striking, but is 
becoming a normal picture for dutch industry. Especially the presence 
of subsidiaries of American corporations allows us to look more closely 
at the possible impact of particular brands of American industrial 
relations culture in dutch industrial relations. Three of the companies 
are small, under 500 employees and the other four companies employ more 
than 2000 employees. In one company union density was about 50%. The 
other companies had a considerably lower union density, some of them 
only had a few percent. 
The differences in collective bargaining arrangements are to a large 
degree the result of our selection. In two of the seven companies there 
is no collective agreement. Among those with a collective agreement two 
cases are covered by industry agreements, while in the remaining three 
companies company-agreements are concluded. In the Netherlands works-
councils are not allowed to negotiate on wages and conditions. By law 
this is a prerogative of trade unions and they are indeed party to the 
collective agreements in the cases concerned with one notable 
exception. In company F the workscouncil negotiates wages and 
conditions and as such the agreement is informal and cannot be 
registered formally by the Ministry of Social Affairs. Strictly 
speaking it is not legally binding from the employees' point of view. 
Amongst our cases however, it is not the only company with a works-
council actively engaged in the establishment of wages and conditions. 
We found that workscouncils perform three roles in establishing wages 
and conditions. The workscouncil as a negotiator, a sounding board and 
an observer. First of all we observe the workscouncil as a proper 
negotiator. This occurs not only in company F, but also in company B. 
However, in company B the negotiating process does not result in an 
informal collective agreement. If necessary, changes are made in the 
individual agreements. The distinctive feature of the workscouncil as a 
negotiator is it's active role in the formulation of demands, the 
actual negotiations and the implementation of the results. The process 
of negotiation is a process of mutual decision-making between 
management and workscouncil. For the workscouncil as a sounding board 
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no real mutuality with management exists. Management decides 
unilateraly, but listens to the wishes of the council or asks for their 
opinions on management proposals. Often the workscouncil is only 
involved in a discussion on the implementation of managements' 
proposals and the possible reactions of the workforce. In company D and 
E the workscouncil functions as a sounding board. In company E the 
industry agreement negotiated between the unions and the employers' 
federation is merely a minimum and the workscouncil discusses proposals 
for comprehensive additions to wages and conditions, made by 
management. 
The workscouncil as an observer implies members of the workscouncil 
being part of the union negotiating team, as individual members of the 
workscouncil or a large union faction within the workscouncil. 
Nevertheless they do not play an active part in the actual 
negotiations, they are attending, observing the formal negotiation 
sessions. This occurs in both company A and C, where the trade unions 
are party to a formal company agreement. 
Last but not least there is of course the possibility that the works-
council has no role at all in the bargaining process. This is the case 
in company G only. 
To what extent do these seven cases represent bargaining arrangements 
in the market sector. In our survey amongst chairmen of workscouncils 
61% was employed In a subsidiary of a corporation (14% Dutch, 47% 
foreign owned) and about one third in an independent company or at a 
corporate level. Just under twenty percent of the companies in the 
market sector have a union density of above 50% and about a quarter 
under 10%, reflecting lower density rates in many service industries in 
comparison with some manufacturing industries. Our cases are not a-
typical in regard to such characteristics as ownership, number of 
employees, union density etc. 
The bargaining arrangements in our survey are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Percentage of companies covered by 
industry agreement 64% 
company agreement 23% 
workscouncils agreement 6% 
no agreement 3% 
other arrangement 4% 
Also in 9% of the companies there was an additional agreement with the 
workscouncil for wages and conditions for a second large group of 
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employees in the company. Questions were asked to determine the extent 
of the workscouncils involvement in the establishment of wages and 
conditions. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: The role of workscouncils in wages and conditions 
negotiator 8.3% 
sounding board 9.9% 
observer 14.4% 
no role 67.3% 
All the variations in agreements, parties to agreements and the roles 
of workscouncil we found in our cases exist on a larger scale. However 
the cases are not representative of the dutch situation. Indeed this is 
not the purpose of our study. Our purpose is to highlight shifts 
between collective and individual agreements and unions and works-
councils as negotiators against the background of changes in the 
strategie position of companies. It is to these that we will turn our 
attention now. 
Changes in company strategy 
For each of the seven companies we looked at changes in their strategie 
position in regard to four dimensions during the five years preceeding 
our research: company structure, market position, products and 
production processes. Each dimension is based on a number of 
indicators. 
. company structure 
Indicators for changes in company structure are changes in decision-
making structures within the corporation (for instance the introduction 
of profit centres) and takeovers, mergers or closures etc. 
. market position 
Items for changes in market position are changes in the relationship 
between marketleaders and -followers in the industry, the development 
of new product-market combinations and changes in the role of 
marketing. 
. products 
Changes in products concern such changes as shifts between lower and 
higher value added products, between bulk and specialized products and 
an increase or decrease in Research and Development. 
. production process 
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For the last dimension, the production process, we looked at such items 
as processinnovation and the introduction of new technology. 
A company scored on a dimension if significant changes occurred in at 
least two items of this dimension the period 1983-1988. The score does 
not represent a judgement on the nature of the change itself. For 
instance a significant improvement as well as a detoriation in the 
relationship between marketleaders and -followers leads to a score. In 
Table 4 the score for each company on all four dimensions is given. 
Table 4: Changes in company strategy 1983-1988 
A B C D E F G 
company structure x x x x 
market position x x x 
products x x x x x 
product process x x 
Some companies have a high score (A, B) , some take an intermediate 
position (C, E, F) and some of the companies have a low score (D, G) . 
In this sense it is possible to construct a continuüm from a strategie 
reorientation on the one hand to gradual adjustment on the other. 
Changes in industrial relations 
In order to tracé changes in industrial relations we looked at four 
indicators. 
1. First of all changes in the nature of the agreement: shifts 
between collective and individual agreements or between Standard 
and minimum agreements. 
2. We also looked - the second indicator - at changes in the parties 
to the agreements (union/workscouncil) and in particular to 
changes in the role of the workscouncil. 
3. Thirdly we studied innovations in the content of the agreements, 
for instance the introduction of working on saturday in 
combination with the introduction of a 36 hour week without it 
being classified as overtime or the disappearance of clauses on 
cost of living indexes or new regulations for the introduction of 
flexible labour. These are substantial changes in dutch industrial 
relations, often not being in accordance with official union 
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policy. 
4. Fourthly we looked at the introduction of flexible payment 
replacing or added to existing Standard pay systems. 
In Table 5 the changes in industrial relations between 1983-1988 are 
registered for each company. Two companies have restructured their 
Table 5: Changes in industrial relations 1983-1988 
A B C D E F G 
nature of agreement x x 
party to agreement x 
content of the 
agreement x x x 
method of wage fixing x x x x 
industrial relations. In company F the workscouncil stood down as the 
negotiater for the informal company agreement. The unions took up this 
position while the workscouncil took the role of observer. A formal 
company agreement was reached between unions and management. A flexible 
payment system was introduced in the workshops related to changes in 
taskorganization. In company C unions and management reasserted the 
position of the company agreement by standardizing wage increases 
throughout the whole company, including its subsidiaries. The 
strengthening of the union's role in collective bargaining also led to 
a change in the role of the workscouncil: from a semi-independent 
sounding board to an observer, within the union negotiation team. 
Flexibility in wages was reasserted through the renewal of the existing 
method for performance appraisal of personnel. 
In some companies no change in industrial relations occurred at all, 
while in other cases the flexibility of wages was increased and/or an 
important change in the content of the agreement took place. In company 
D the industrial relations were restructured just prior to our 
investigation: from a collective agreement with the unions to 
agreements with individual employees and the workscouncil in the role 
of a sounding board. Also there were substantial changes in the 
contents of industrial relations: from a Standard to a "cafeteria" 
approach. Each employee can individually choose his or her own menu in 
the numbers of hours worked, in relation to pay and pension within 
certain limits. 
In our survey of chairmen of workscouncils 13% answered that a change 
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occurred in either the nature of the agreement and/or the parties to 
the agreement in the five years prior to the survey. We also asked 
whether the respondents expected a similar change in the near future, 
the five years after the questionnaire took place. Nearly 82% expected 
no changes what so ever. About 5% indicated a shift from industry to 
company bargaining as a possible future development with the unions as 
the bargaining agent. Another 3.5% expected a shift from a collective 
agreement with the unions to an informal agreement with the works-
council, while a smaller number (2%) indicated a change in the opposite 
direction. Considering the few companies (n-13) where the nature and 
the party to the agreement changed prior to the survey and with more 
changes expected in the near future, there was a "turnover" of about 
25% in bargaining arrangements over a ten year period. In our cases two 
of the seven companies redesigned their industrial relations. 
Strategie change and the redesign of industrial relations 
So far we have described changes in the strategie position of companies 
(company structure, market position, products and production process) 
in order to study the effect of those changes on company industrial 
relations (the nature of agreement, the parties to the agreement, the 
contents of the agreement and the method of wage fixing). A second 
element in our study is to look at these changes in industrial 
relations in a broad maimer, to include internal labour market policies 
and policies for controling labour costs. In Table 6 the changes in the 
companies strategie position are related to the changes in industrial 
relations, labour costs and the internal labour markets. Looking at 
this table, companies with an active industrial relations policy seem 
to be more active in controling labour costs and in internal labour 
market policy. 
Labour costs were important in all companies irrespective of the share 
of wages in turnover. Even for a company with a relatively low share, 
it may be one of it's few variables to influence vis a vis it's 
competitors. In all companies attention was focused on controlling 
labour costs and so we looked for special and extra measures (such as) 
reducing numbers of employees and/or the level of wage costs per 
employee. Three companies (B, C and F) had introduced such special 
Table 6: Relationships between strategie change and changes in 
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industrial relations, labour costs and labourmarket-
policy 
strategie labour composition industrial 
changes cost of the relations 
labour force 
A 3x 0 + + 
B 3x ++ + ++ 
C 2x ++ + +++ 
D lx 0 + + 
E 2x 0 0 0 
F 2x ++ + +++ 
G lx 0 0 0 
measures, always in a combination of numbers and level of payment per 
employee. Redundancies took place and cutbacks were introduced for 
benefits such as pensions and travel allowances and in one case the 
actual wage level of young or temporary employees was lowered. 
Indicators for changes in internal labour market policies were shifts 
between fixed and temporary personnel and in the composition of skill 
in the labour force. Only one company (C) increased temporary 
personnel. Company F decreased production personnel but increased 
personnel for Research and Development and marketing in order to 
develop new products. In company B less skilied staff was taken on in 
order to capture lower segments of the market for financial services. 
The companies implementing severe measures to diminish labour costs 
were in deep economie trouble. To obtain a better control of wages and 
conditions in the long term, the role of the unions and of collective 
bargaining was strengthened in company C and F. Change in the strategie 
position originated from a defensive attitude and led to a redesign of 
the industrial relations and to changes in internal labour market 
policy. In contrast, one company (A) is in the midst of a strategie 
reorientation as part of a new growth strategy. It increased its 
personnel in marketing and R 6e D, while maintaining the level of 
production personnel. It has introduced changes in the content of its 
collective agreement, reducing the number of hours worked in 
combination with flexible working time. Within the near future the 
company aims to include flexible payment systems for it's increasing 
share of white collar workers. Company D restructured - as described 
above - its industrial relations prior to our investigation. Only 
company E and G have not introduced any changes at all in industrial 
relations, labour costs and internal labour markets. However company E 
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is preparing such changes presently. It is considering cutbacks in 
level of benefits and other secundary arrangements and reeducating 
production personnel for staff functions. The workscouncil established 
a novum for dutch industrial relations. As wage negotiations are 
getting more difficult, it has hired a union official to negotiate not 
for the union members in the company as such, but for the workscouncil 
with its non-union majority: a new hybrid is born in dutch industrial 
relations. The background for these changes also lies in the strategie 
repositioning of the company. Indeed at present this company would 
score higher in the degree of strategie reorientation. 
One has to be careful in establishing a direct relationship between 
changes in the strategie position of a company and the redesign of its 
industrial relations based on a case study. First of all the economie 
situation is paramount in triggering a strategie orientation, for some 
of our companies their survival in the short term was at stake. In that 
case it is a decrease in economie performance and an increase in 
competition which is the cause of measures to redesign the industrial 
relations. Secondly it is important to look at the degree of autonomy a 
company has in establishing its own strategy and its industrial 
relations. In Table 7 the results of this analysis are presented. 
Table 7: Degree of autonomy in company strategy and in 
wages and conditions 
company stategy 
high low 
high Ba Ca F A 
wages 
and conditions 
low G D E 
a
' case study at corporate-level 
Notably companies which are not actively seeking change in industrial 
relations (D, E and G) have a low degree of autonomy in establishing 
wages and conditions. In company B and A the case study was carried out 
at corporate level and autonomy for both areas was - as to be 
expected - located at this level. A low level of autonomy in company 
strategy is however not necessarily a stumbling block for redesigning 
industrial relations, as long as there is autonomy in establishing 
wages and conditions (notably company A and especially F). 
Another important factor in changes in industrial relations are changes 
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in the employment relation. Williamson has described the employment 
relations in internal labour markets in terms of the degree to which 
human assets are specific to a company and the ease with which the 
productivity of individual workers can be measured (Williamson, 1984). 
We find in our cases quite often a change in the composition of the 
workforce from a lower to a higher level of specificity, often combined 
with a decrease in the ability to measure workers' productivity, for 
instance a shift from production personnel to R and D personnel. Such a 
shift is in turn related to changes in the strategie position of the 
companies, from bulk to more specialized products with a higher added 
value. Underlying trends in the employment relation based on a up-
market company strategy in regard to products and processes could 
explain an increase in the number of workers not steeped in trade union 
traditions or more oriented towards their individual interests, 
especially if in union agreements Standard relations prevail. Most of 
our cases were involved in an up-market stratety, but a down-market 
strategy (lower niche in the market, simple work tasks, more temporary 
personnel) is also an option. 
Three of our f our cases are subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Does a 
factor called "U.S. industrial relations culture" come into play? 
Indeed in all three cases the U.S. subsidiary preferred dealing with 
the workscouncil in establishing wages and conditions as is shown in 
Table 1. In the companies D and E the workscouncil acts as a sounding 
board. National management has no autonomy in establishing wages and 
conditions and so it cannot enter in a negotiation process proper, 
neither with a union nor with a workscouncil. The workscouncil as a 
sounding board is a neat solution for involving personnel, while at the 
same time maintaining unilateral decisionmaking. One of these companies 
has a non-union policy in the U.S., but the other does not. In company 
F management has autonomy in establishing wages and conditions, the 
workscouncil acts as a negotiator and in the redesign of its industrial 
relations, the company switched to a collective agreement with the 
unions. This company has a non-union stance in the U.S.. There is also 
a Dutch company among our cases (B) without a collective agreement and 
a non-union policy. 
In our survey amongst workscouncil chairman we found a higher incidence 
of workscouncils acting as a negotiator in subsidiaries of 
international companies, 9.6%. The figure for Dutch owned subsidiaries 
was 5%. Our cases and survey point towards internationalization of 
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companies as an important factor in changes occurring in dutch 
industrial relations, but one cannot speak of a U.S. anti-union 
culture. It is also possible that U.S management traditionally prefers 
dealing with a representative of personnel at the level of 
subsidiaries. As unions are often not present at this level in the 
Netherlands, it leaves the workscouncil as the only alternative. 
Conclusion and discusssion 
Among our cases we have not witnessed a shift away from collective 
bargaining or the unions. Indeed in some of the companies the opposite 
has taken place. In the face of economie difficulties and increased 
competition, the role of collective bargaining and of trade unions has 
strengthened in two cases. The survey among chairmen of workscouncils 
shows no evidence of a diminishing role of collective bargaining and of 
unions losing their position in the near future, vis a vis works-
councils either. During the period studied, the "rate of turnover" in 
bargaining arrangements did not seem particularly high ("25%" over ten 
years), we have no data from earlier periods for a comparison. There is 
no significant shift from institutions to market forces as regulators 
of industrial relations. However there is a gradual and only very 
recent development from institutions regulating industrial relations at 
industry or corporate level to company level. As shown by an earlier 
study of developments in the dutch bargaining structure during the 
sixties and the seventies a dominant trend has been the establishment 
of large bargaining units, being either industry-based or based on 
large corporations (Huiskamp, 1988). 
In our case study we have recorded the degree of strategie change: 
ranging from an adjustment to a changing situation to strategie 
reorientation. Most of our companies implementing a strategie 
reorientation acted defensively, they were faced with increased 
competition or a downturn in economie performance. However in some of 
our companies management had an offensive motive, to improve their 
present level of performance. Companies may have a choice between an 
up-market and a down-market strategy. In a up-market strategy products 
and production (organization, technology and the labour force) are 
upgraded. In a down-market strategy the companies looks for a lower 
niche in the market. Most of our companies chose an up-market strategy. 
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At the company level one is faced with a choice between an quantative 
and qualitative labour strategy. A quantative labour strategy implies a 
reduction in labour costs through cutbacks in numbers employed and in 
wage costs per employee. A qualitative labour strategy also implies 
changes in the design of the industrial relations. 
The choices are made especially by management, but in some cases unions 
or workscouncils took the initiative. It is important for future 
research to be able to classify strategie choices open to management 
(and unions or workscouncils) in terms of adjustment/reorientation, 
defensive/offensive, up-market/down-market and to predict quantative 
and qualitative changes in future industrial relations. 
Is there a need for a new approach to replace or augment the system 
approach? Yes. Since the early dominance of the systems approach and 
the rules regulating (the equilibrium of) the system there has been a 
tendency to neglect actors and their choices in behaviour. An effort 
was undertaken to rectify this imbalance during the seventies with 
numerous studies on unions and shopfloor organizations as the main 
agents of change. The theoretical background for this effort was often 
found in a marxist approach open for conflict, strategy and change, but 
within a class perspective (Hyman, 1975). Kochan and others have 
formulated a "strategie choice" approach in order to study the choices 
made by management at strategie levels of companies (Kochan, 1986). 
First of all one has to be carefull to change one's approach, to call 
for a new "paradigma" every time certain phenomena become more 
manifest. Management as an actor in its own right was largely forgotten 
and a redress is necessary and under way (K. Thurley, S. Wood, 1983; 
T.A. Kochan, R.B. McKenzie, J. Chalykoff, 1986; P. Marginson, 1985). 
Secondly the concept of paradigmatic change as borrowed from Kuhn does 
not constitute a very satisfactory way of describing the present 
situation in industrial relations theory. In the terms of Kuhn all 
social sciences (including economics) are in a preparadigma stage of 
development. The concept of paradigma indicates truly great changes in 
science, for instance from classical physics to quantum physics. If one 
does apply the concept of paradigma it may be better to speak of a 
situation of "poly-paradigma" in social sciences, including industrial 
relations. Alternatively one can also take Lakatos' criticism of Kuhns 
concept of paragdigma as a starting point (Lakatos, 1970). Lakatos 
proposes to speak in terms of research programmes. A research programme 
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contains a hard core of basic assumptions and concepts and a number of 
related "softer" theories. In the case of industrial relations theory 
such theories could be for instance (inter)organizational theory, dual 
labourmarket theory, labour process theory, theories on corporate 
strategy etc. Lakatos formulates rules for establishing "progressive" 
and "degenerative" programmes. An important criteria in discriminating 
between a progressive and a degenerative research progranune is the 
ability to predict new phenonema or facts in industrial relations. 
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